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Abstract 
 
This report originates in a workshop held at Sandia National Laboratories, bringing together a 
variety of external experts with Sandia personnel to discuss “The Implications of Global Climate Change 
for International Security.” Whatever the future of the current global warming trend, paleoclimatic history 
shows that climate change happens, sometimes abruptly. These changes can severely impact human water 
supplies, agriculture, migration patterns, infrastructure, financial flows, disease prevalence, and economic 
activity. Those impacts, in turn, can lead to national or international security problems stemming from 
aggravation of internal conflicts, increased poverty and inequality, exacerbation of existing international 
conflicts, diversion of national and international resources from international security programs (military or 
non-military), contribution to global economic decline or collapse, or international realignments based on 
climate change mitigation policies. After reviewing these potential problems, the report concludes with a 
brief listing of some research, technology, and policy measures that might mitigate them. 
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Foreword 
On September 25 and 26, 2003, the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 
Advanced Concepts Group, working with the SNL Energy, Information, and 
Infrastructure Surety Division convened a workshop to explore “The Implications of 
Global Climate Change for International Security.” Visiting Sandia were a dozen experts 
in international environmental policy, environmental security, and international security 
(see Appendix I). Joining this group were 16-20 Sandia technical and managerial staff 
with relevant interests, knowledge, and responsibilities (see Appendix II). 
Both in plenary sessions and in breakout groups of about 10, the workshop 
participants were asked to discuss the following topics: 
 possible physical and environmental effects of long-term as well as abrupt 
climate changes; 
 consequences for human societies of such effects; 
 pathways by which these consequences may lead to threats to national and 
international security; and 
 scenarios which could illustrate (not exhaustively describe) how a few 
such pathways might lead to a regional conflict, a crisis for U.S. national 
security policy, and a change in the global international system. 
Because the focus of the workshop was international security, the emphasis was 
on the downside of climate change effects—the potential risks to security. Thus, the 
reader will find the tone of this report to be somewhat pessimistic, since it does not 
address the processes and capabilities that might conceivably help social groups and 
nations, without much planning or preparation, cope with change effects. 
Finally, although this workshop was primarily an exercise in problem exploration, 
the participants also discussed some of the policy implications of the pathways and 
scenarios they had identified. 
This report is based primarily on the proceedings of the workshop, but it is not a 
transcript or a direct summary of the day and a half of discussions. Rather, it attempts to 
compile the ideas and information that emerged from the workshop into a more coherent 
and readable document than a verbatim record would have been. Note, therefore, that 
while the workshop participants were the source of the report’s substance, the author 
alone is responsible for its flaws. 
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Executive Summary 
The theme of the workshop reported here was the implications of climate change 
for international security. Therefore our focus is on the potential connections between 
climate change consequences and the ability of nation-states (individually or in groups) to 
secure themselves from harm caused by other nation-states. The argument here is not that 
climate change consequences are going to be either necessary or sufficient causes for 
international security problems. It is possible, though, that they might tip already 
precarious situations. 
The Earth’s climate is warming, albeit with major uncertainties about how much, 
how fast, and by what causes. Climate changes may occur gradually or abruptly, and in 
surprising ways (one projected sequence of events has northern Europe becoming much 
colder as a result of the Earth’s climate getting warmer.)  
Climatic change can result in a range of effects on the world environment: a 
higher frequency of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, more rain, less rain 
(drought), floods, large changes in land and sea ecologies, sea-level rise. These effects, in 
turn, singly or in combination, can severely impact human water supplies, agriculture, 
migration patterns, infrastructure, financial flows, disease prevalence, and economic 
activity. 
Both the first-order environmental effects of climate change and the societal 
consequences they lead to may exhibit non-linear behavior—the things that happen will 
not necessarily follow projected trends, but may be fairly sudden state changes that 
follow the crossing of thresholds or tipping points. The surprises that happen may not be 
predictable, but it is predictable that surprises will happen. 
Gradual change is easier to adapt to than sudden change. But, in either case, 
different societies will have different social and economic resources for adaptation. 
Poorer classes of society within nations, and poorer nations in the international 
community, have less reserve capacity upon which to draw. In several of the less wealthy 
regions of the world, climate change consequences might come in addition to already 
stressing conditions: rapid population growth, strained agricultural resources, inadequate 
freshwater supplies, poor health services. 
There are several ways to hypothesize that societal impacts (relating to water, 
agriculture, infrastructure, health, finance, economics) of climate change effects could 
result in international security problems (or benefits): 
 aggravation of internal conflicts,  
 increased poverty and inequality, 
 aggravation of existing international conflicts, 
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 diversion of national and international resources from international 
security programs (military or non-military), 
 contribution to global economic decline or collapse, 
 international realignments based on climate change mitigation policies, or 
 reduction of oil dependence (benefit). 
Near the end of the workshop, suggestions for research and policy directions were 
briefly discussed. First, it would be helpful to decision makers if research on climate 
change, climate change effects, and human consequences of those effects could reduce 
the current uncertainties about how much of what might happen when. An effort that 
melded the expertise of physical, social, and computational scientists might make 
progress in that direction. Second, a better understanding of the phenomena might lead to 
technology developments for better adaptation. Third, national and international policies 
might better anticipate future needs for response and adaptation. For example, 
international development assistance might take into account the need to deal with 
climate change effects; international public health efforts could be strengthened to deal 
with climate change effect disease problems; or national or international capabilities 
could be developed to provide rapid infrastructure restoration assistance in the wake of 
environmental disasters. 
Because current uncertainties make it so hard to specify appropriate investment 
levels in anticipatory measures, special emphasis might be given to “no regrets” measures 
that promise substantial benefits regardless of the specific course of climate trends.  
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Three Scenarios 
The following scenarios are stories about how the effects climate change–related 
phenomena could interact with other social, political, economic, and environmental 
trends to threaten the security of nations. The stories center on real-world countries, 
regions, and international institutions, but they are not predictions of what will happen in 
the real world. Such predictions, most especially 20-50 years in the future, are not 
possible. It would not be surprising, though, if the world of the future sees events 
somewhat like those in the scenarios. The scenarios are meant to illustrate how complex, 
interrelated sets of variables (of which climate change-related consequences would only 
be one subset) could combine to pose major challenges to future national and 
international policy makers.1 
South Asia in 2020 
It is 2020 and the climate has not been kind to Pakistan. The annual monsoon 
rains have become sparse, and when rain does come, it is out of synchronization with the 
traditional crop planting season. Deforestation has led to soil erosion and silting of dams. 
In the Indus Delta, the drought has nearly completed the ongoing degradation of the 
mangrove forests, while fishing areas have been both polluted and over-harvested. With a 
growing population, the country is no longer self-sufficient in food production.  
Lakes supplying water to Karachi are shrinking, while the city is swelling with 
angry young men no longer able to make a living back on the farm. They are ripe for 
recruitment from groups promising radical change. 
Some radical change has already occurred in Islamabad, since radical Islamists 
now control the intelligence and military services. But even those organizations are 
regionally and ideologically divided. The “central” government controls only parts of the 
country. The south and north are increasingly at odds. A group in the north has increased 
infiltration of Kashmir and Indian counterattacks into Pakistan are growing more 
frequent. Regional warlords now control much of the west, frequently colluding with 
Afghan warlords in the drug trade. 
The government will not admit it, but two nuclear weapons have disappeared 
from the Pakistani arsenal, and no one can or will say who has them. 
Rise of China in 2030 
It is 2030, and the U.S. has suffered a series of climate-related setbacks. 
Prolonged drought in Mexico has produced millions of  “eco-refugees,” many of whom 
are illegally joining friends and relatives in the U.S., hoping to find work. But unlike in 
                                                 
1 The scenarios here are based on ideas generated by the workshop working groups, but not identical to those presented in the 
workshop. In particular, some of the groups produced alternate outcomes based on more optimistic, and perhaps no less realistic, 
assumptions than the ones made here. The thrust of this report is to call attention to potential threats and the possible utility of 
trying to anticipate them—not to problems that will take care of themselves. 
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the past, even low-paid, unskilled work is hard to find in a U.S. that has suffered several 
years of recession. The Federal budget is in crisis, with Social Security and Medicare 
payments to the “baby boom” generation taking more than 14 percent of GDP. Recovery 
of the economy has been hampered by three simultaneous epidemics of re-emerging 
infectious diseases. Nor have the high energy prices helped (on-again-off-again Iraqi-
Saudi Arabian clashes have reduced Persian Gulf oil exports). The sudden cooling of 
northern Europe has greatly weakened that area economically and led to destabilizing 
shifts of population. U.S.-European relations are greatly strained, in part because of the 
belief held by many Europeans that the U.S. renunciation of the Kyoto-Bonn accord on 
reducing Greenhouse Gases (GHG) has caused their predicament.  
In the Far East, the situation is different. A booming China has been absorbing 
foreign direct investment that used to go to the U.S., while the Chinese domestic 
marketplace has been able to take up the slack left by the shrinkage of U.S. exports to the 
U.S. Chinese mastery of electronics technology has allowed it to carry out its own 
“revolution in military affairs,” with impressive intelligence, communications, 
computing, and precision delivery capabilities.  
Recent climatic changes have not deprived China of agriculturally productive land 
but they have shifted the regions of productivity, leading to major migration and the need 
for realignment of infrastructure. This activity has, in turn, increased Chinese energy 
demands beyond those previously forecast. With the instabilities of the Middle East, 
China has been placing increasing emphasis on guaranteeing its oil supplies with 
exclusive contractual relationships with sellers and on developing the military capabilities 
to protect the lines of oil transport.  
This apparent effort by China to dominate essential resources, coupled with a 
general rise of international assertiveness, has made Japan and Unified Korea 
increasingly wary. For some time, they have been doubting the willingness and ability of 
the U.S. to help them stand up to Chinese pressures. Japan is close to a decision to build 
its own nuclear deterrent arsenal. China has warned them that this would lead to the most 
serious repercussions.  
The U.S. President has asked the National Security Council what the U.S. should 
do now.  
Global Public Health and Trade Crisis in 2025 
It is February of 2025 and South America is nearing the end of its second summer 
of extraordinary heat waves. Brazil and Argentina have been hit hard by a mysterious 
new disease epidemic that has sickened thousands and killed hundreds. At first (since no 
cause can be determined, but whole families are contracting the disease), human-to-
human transmission is suspected. Later, as cattle get sick, “mad-cow disease”-like prions 
are suspected. Finally, however, it appears that human and animal grain supplies have 
been contaminated with the hitherto unknown pathogen. The unusually hot and moist 
grain transport and storage conditions may or may not have something to do with the 
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food contamination. The epidemic spreads to Japan and China, now major importers of 
South American foodstuffs. 
To make matters worse, U.S. intelligence has picked up conversations among 
terrorists groups proposing to intentionally spread the grain disease to U.S. and European 
farmlands. 
With no reliable test for the mystery contamination, widespread fear causes severe 
constriction in international trade in foodstuffs. Existing stocks of food and feed grains 
are destroyed. International travel becomes more difficult, first because of fears of human 
transmission of the disease, then because of security measures intended to prevent 
terrorist smuggling of the infection. The eight southern provinces of China, already with 
food production lowered by drought, are threatened with famine. Appearance of the grain 
disease in India leads to suspicions of Pakistani sabotage, heightening recently renewed 
tensions between the two countries. In many poorer countries, a decline in nutrition 
weakens the population against not only the mystery disease, but other diseases as well. 
The international community has organizations that are supposed to keep this kind 
of food and disease crisis from getting out of hand, but they have proved unable to keep 
up. The World Health Organization lacked the resources to maintain the kind of global 
health surveillance that might have detected and pinpointed the cause of the disease 
earlier. The Global Information and Early Warning System of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization does not detect that the disease is food-related in time to prevent the food 
trade crisis. Exporter complaints are made to the World Trade Organization that the 
blocking of food imports is not justified by the known facts about how much grain is 
contaminated. Importing nations, however, say that even retaliatory embargoes will not 
deter them from protecting their populations from the risk. Globally, an economic 
turndown begins as food prices rise, debt servicing falls behind, and trade shrinks. 
Climate Change: Gradual or Abrupt?2 
The particular scenarios above are unlikely to occur just as described. But, in the 
long run, the earth’s climate changes. As discussed in the next subsection, there are major 
uncertainties about when, how, and why climate change will happen in the future. But the 
potential exists for considerable impacts of climate change on human economies and 
societies. Moreover, given the complexity of the systems involved, the impacts might 
easily turn out to be non-linear—to occur suddenly as unpredictable “tipping points” are 
reached. These impacts, in turn, could have important implications for the security of 
individual nations, regions, and the international system as a whole. Although climate 
change impacts seem unlikely to be the primary causes of international conflicts, they do 
appear to have much potential for amplifying a variety of international security problems. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has conducted 
simulations that predict “…a globally-averaged surface temperature increase by the end 
                                                 
2 Most of this section originally appeared in Thomas H. Karas, Energy and National Security (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories, SAND2003-328, September 2003), pp. 21-22. 
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of the century of 1.4 to 5.8°C (2.5 to 10.4°F) relative to 1990.”3 According to a 
committee of the National Research Council, the scientific community generally thinks 
that warming observed in the last 50 years is likely to have been due, at least in part, to 
the human-caused increase in levels of GHG, particularly carbon dioxide, in the 
atmosphere, although “…uncertainty remains because of (1) the level of natural 
variability inherent in the climate system on time scales of decades to centuries, (2) the 
questionable ability of models to accurately simulate natural variability on those long 
time scales, and (3) the degree of confidence that can be placed on reconstructions of 
global mean temperature over the past millennium based on proxy evidence.”4 
The models used by the IPCC suggested a gradual warming over the course of the 
next century. Moreover, since even the most intensive efforts to curb GHG emissions will 
not be able to stabilize atmospheric concentrations for some time, some additional 
warming is inevitable if those concentrations are indeed the major cause.  
The paleoclimatic record, however, shows that, in the past, dramatic climate 
changes have occurred very abruptly (over years, not just over decades), as well.5 (See 
Box 1.)Obviously these changes did not result from human-generated GHG. Therefore, it 
is quite possible they may occur again, whatever the future effect of the gases turns out to 
be. However, there is some concern that the warming induced by GHG might accelerate 
other processes and thereby increase the likelihood of more abrupt changes. 
                                                 
3 Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council, “Summary,” Climate Change Science: An Analysis of 
Some Key Questions (Washington: National Academy Press, 2001.  
4 Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council, “Summary,” Climate Change Science: An Analysis of 
Some Key Questions (Washington: National Academy Press, 2001. 
5 Committee on Abrupt Climate Change, National Research Council, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises (Washington: 
National Academy Press, 2001). http://books.nap.edu/books/0309075742/html/. See also Spencer Weart, “The Discovery of Rapid 
Climate Change,” Physics Today, August 2003, http://www.physicstoday.org/vol-56/iss-8/p30.html. 
Box 1: Abrupt Climate Change  
Recent scientific evidence shows that major and widespread climate changes have occurred with 
startling speed. For example, roughly half the north Atlantic warming since the last ice age was achieved in 
only a decade, and it was accompanied by significant climatic changes across most of the globe. Similar 
events, including local warmings as large as 16°C, occurred repeatedly during the slide into and climb out 
of the last ice age. Human civilizations arose after those extreme, global ice-age climate jumps. Severe 
droughts and other regional climate events during the current warm period have shown similar tendencies 
of abrupt onset and great persistence, often with adverse effects on societies.  
Abrupt climate changes were especially common when the climate system was being forced to 
change most rapidly. Thus, greenhouse warming and other human alterations of the earth system may 
increase the possibility of large, abrupt, and unwelcome regional or global climatic events. The abrupt 
changes of the past are not fully explained yet, and climate models typically underestimate the size, speed, 
and extent of those changes. Hence, future abrupt changes cannot be predicted with confidence, and climate 
surprises are to be expected.  
Source: Committee on Abrupt Climate Change, National Research Council, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises 
(Washington: National Academy Press, 2001). http://books.nap.edu/books/0309075742/html/. 
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A dramatic—if low-probability—possibility for abrupt change would be the 
shutting down of the ocean “conveyor belt” (see Figure 1) that brings warm South 
Atlantic water to northwestern Europe. The paradoxical result might be that a global 
warming trend could lead to severe cooling—possibly a return of glacial ice—in northern 
Europe. 6  
                                                 
6 Peter U. Clark, Nicklas G. Pisias, Thomas F. Stocker, and Andrew J. Weaver, “The role of the thermohaline circulation in abrupt 
climate change,” Nature 415, 863 - 869 (21 February 2002) at 
http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v415/n6874/full/415863a_r.html . 
Figure 1: The Great Ocean Conveyor Belt 
 
The global conveyor belt thermohaline circulation is driven primarily by the formation and sinking of deep water (from 
around 1500m to the Antarctic bottom water overlying the bottom of the ocean) in the Norwegian Sea. This circulation is 
thought to be responsible for the large flow of upper ocean water from the tropical Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the 
Indonesian Archipelogo (sic). The two counteracting forcings operating in the North Atlantic control the conveyor belt 
circulation: (1) the thermal forcing (high-latitude cooling and the low-latitude heating) which drives a polar southward flow; 
and (2) haline forcing (net high-latitude freshwater gain and low-latitude evaporation) which moves in the opposite 
direction. In today's Atlantic the thermal forcing dominates, hence, the flow of upper current from south to north.  
When the strength of the haline forcing increases due to excess precipitation, runoff, or ice melt the conveyor belt will 
weaken or even shut down. The variability in the strength of the conveyor belt will lead to climate change in Europe and it 
could also influence in other areas of the global ocean. The North Atlantic atmosphere-ocean-cryosphere system 
appears to have natural cycles of many timescales in switching the conveyor belt. Periodic movement of excessive ice 
from the Arctic into the Greenland Sea appears to be responsible for the interdecadal variability of the conveyor belt. 
There is no evidence yet that the influx of interdecadal switching extends beyond the North Atlantic Ocean. 
Source: “Vital Climate Graphics,” United Nations Environment Program/ GRID Arendal at  
http://www.grida.no/climate/vital/index.htm 
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First Order Effects of Climate Change 
Scientists have identified numerous potential environmental consequences if the 
current trend in global warming continues or intensifies;7 these are summarized in Table 
1. Additional studies have tried to assess how climate change might affect several regions 
of the world.8 As with the modeling and prediction of future global temperature levels, 
estimates of when, how, and where these effects of climate change might take place are 
highly uncertain. Making the problem of prediction even more difficult, many of the 
effects listed here may well have significant feedback loops both with each other and 
with the long-term global warming process. Finally, although long-term trends can be 
extrapolated with at least some confidence, abrupt local events or global changes 
resulting from some set of variables reaching an unforeseen “tipping point” are sure to be 
surprises.  
Table 1: First-Order Effects of Climate Change 
System Affected Description 
Weather and hydrology Increased or more intense storms, floods, droughts 
More rain, less snowpack and glaciation 
Higher daytime temperatures; heat waves 
Increased evaporation from lakes, reservoirs 
Higher nighttime temperatures 
Regional cooling (if ocean conveyor disrupted) 
Ecology Deforestation, northern extension of forests, increased forest fires 
Greater vegetation growth due to increased CO2 (but possibly fewer 
nutrients) 
Regional changes in animal species 
Changes in plant and pest life-cycles 
Northward movement of tropical disease vectors 
Enhanced disease infectivity 
Oceans and Coasts Decreases in some fish stocks 
Loss coral reefs, wetlands 
Sea-level rise: coastal submersion, coastal erosion, saltwater 
contamination of fresh water 
Increase of toxic marine species 
Deglaciation and ice-pack melting 
Other Release of additional greenhouse gases from earth surface: CO2, 
Methane 
(Not related to warming: increased ozone depletion) 
 
                                                 
7 See Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability—Summary for Policymakers,  http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/wg2SPMfinal.pdf.  
8 See Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability, full report at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm. 
. 
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Societal Impacts of Climate Change 
The direct effects of climate change summarized above could pose a variety of 
challenges to interrelated systems on which human societies depend—fresh water 
supplies, agriculture, other economic activity, settlements and infrastructure, and healthy 
individuals. Box 2 describes many of these potential impacts, but categorizes them by the 
climate change effect rather than the impact. In this section, we review the impacts by 
system affected rather than by cause. We focus mainly on negative consequences, 
because we are moving toward identifying potential threats to national and international 
security. Positive consequences are possible for some nations in some cases. These could 
also affect the security situations of nations, regions, or the international system as a 
whole. 
Another point to note here is that the subsections below of the various societal 
systems (e.g. water, agriculture) arbitrarily separates them for discussion, but that they 
are in many ways tightly coupled and affect one another profoundly. Moreover, the 
climate change effects may worsen trends that would already exist even if climate were to 
remain relatively constant. Some of these connections and possible feedback loops are 
sketched out at various points in this section. Note also that just as the physical 
phenomena described thus far may have non-linear effects, human systems may also 
change in abrupt, unpredictable ways.   
Water  
According to the IPCC working group on climate change impacts, about 5 billion 
people may live in water-stressed regions by 2025, and climate change effects could 
further reduce streamflow and groundwater recharge in many of these regions.9 Changes 
in water temperature can also affect water quality—the types and levels of pollutants 
carried. The supply of clean water for some urban areas may be affected. Water for 
agricultural irrigation may become scarcer. Competition within or between nations for 
water resources may be heightened. In other areas, increased precipitation could lead to 
flooding problems.  
 The ultimate impact of water scarcities (or of flood damage) on a nation will 
depend greatly on the available political and technical arrangements for water 
management. As with other potential climate-change impacts, the poorer, less developed 
countries seem at greatest risk. 
                                                 
9 See footnote 7 reference, p. 9. 
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Box 2: Human Impacts of Climate Change Phenomena 
Source: “Summary for Policymakers,” Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, A Report of Working Group II of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC: 1981), at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARspm.pdf. 
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Agriculture 
Not only could increased droughts lead to agricultural water scarcities, but higher 
temperatures could lead to higher crop water demand. Flooding, soil erosion, and 
saltwater contamination can make farming more difficult. Extreme variability between 
drought and intense precipitation can damage agriculture. Productivity can also be 
reduced by pest infestations and crop diseases. 
Since higher percentages of people in less developed countries depend directly on 
agriculture, declines in food productivity could affect those countries most strongly. 
Poorer countries that rely heavily on food imports could suffer if reduced production 
elsewhere led to higher prices. 
Settlements and infrastructure 
Increased storm intensities, flooding, coastal erosion, and sea-level rise10 can 
damage buildings, roads, and utility distribution systems such as electric power lines. As 
population concentrates in cities, the value of infrastructure at risk increases. Drought can 
reduce energy supplies to regions dependent on hydroelectric power. Warming may 
reduce demand for space heating energy in some places, but increase demand for cooling 
energy elsewhere. 
Decreased agricultural productivity may lead to increased migration to cities, 
thereby adding to the pressures on urban infrastructure and services.  
Finance11 
Insurance instruments can help spread the risks from losses due to extreme 
weather events (life and property, business loss and delays, crops), and governments can 
supplement private insurance programs. However, there are also some dangers that 
insurers and reinsurers, including governments, may be vulnerable to abrupt increases in 
losses. There is also the possibility that government-subsidized insurance can give 
incentives to people to adapt poorly to environmental risks (e.g. floods) by underpricing 
the costs of doing so. On the other hand, when insurance prices accurately reflect the 
risks involved in locating homes and infrastructure in places vulnerable to extreme 
weather, they can encourage more effective adaptive behavior. 
                                                 
10 Sea-level rise can multiple socio-economic effects well beyond the direct damage to flooded infrastructure. See See Working 
Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Chapter 6: Coastal Zones and Marine Ecosystems” in Climate 
Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability at  http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap6.pdf. For 
global statistics on population near coasts, see R. Gommes et. al., “Potential Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Populations and 
Agriculture,” SD Dimensions , posted March 1998 (Sustainable Development Department, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
United Nations, at   http://www.fao.org/sd/eidirect/EIre0045.htm. 
11 See Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Chapter 8: Insurance and Other Financial 
Instruments,” in Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap7.pdf. See also Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, “Climate Change & 
the Financial Services Industry, Module 1-Threats and Opportun;ites, “ July 2002 at 
http://www.innovestgroup.com/pdfs/Innovest_UNEP1_10_15_02.pdf and “Module 2: A Blueprint for Action” at 
http://www.innovestgroup.com/pdfs/Innovest_UNEP2_10_15_02.pdf.  
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Lack of availability of insurance for investment projects in less developed 
countries could deter needed foreign investment. Today’s global capital markets have 
various instruments for hedging and diversifying risks (e.g. syndication, options, swaps, 
futures contracts). But developing countries may be less able to take advantage of these. 
It may be, however, that new financial instruments can be developed to spread and hedge 
against the risks in these countries. 
Richer countries like the United States may be able to cope fairly well with the 
financial impacts of climate change effects. However, the U.S. (and to an even greater 
extent Japan and Western Europe) in the next few decades will also be facing substantial 
population aging that will result in smaller percentages of the people working and more 
people dependent on Social Security, pensions, and subsidized health care. Thus, the 
needs of the aging will compete for government funds with domestic adaptation to 
climate change effects, foreign development aid and disaster assistance, and military 
requirements. 
Health12 
Climate change effects can have adverse consequences for human health. With 
warming, disease vectors such as mosquitos may move farther north and to higher 
altitudes. Disease transmission seasons may last longer. Extreme weather events (storms, 
floods), besides injuring people directly, may cause population displacement, damage 
food production and distribution, or reduce the availability or quality of fresh water—any 
of which can increase the risks that infectious diseases will spread.  
Areas with limited public health services—often the case in developing 
countries—would be especially vulnerable.  
In a 2000 National Intelligence Estimate describing the security threat from 
infectious diseases, the U.S. National Intelligence Council predicted that over the next ten 
years the threat would first worsen, then modestly improve as global socio-economic 
conditions improved.13 But climate-related increases in disease prevalence, combined 
with the challenges of other climate change effects, might stymie that progress.14 
Economics 
Combinations of some or all of the above phenomena can seriously harm local, 
national, or regional economies, and perhaps the global economy. Water scarcities can 
reduce crop production, as well as divert worker energies to obtaining family water 
supplies. Decreased agricultural productivity may also lead to malnutrition or to higher 
                                                 
12 See Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Chapter 9: Human Health,” in Climate Change 2001: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap9.pdf.  
13 U.S. National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States (NIE99-17D, 
January 2000), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/nie/report/nie99-17d.html.  
 
14 For more on the political and security implications of disease (relevant to the section below on security consequences of climate 
change effects), see Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and 
Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
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food prices; it may lead to migration of farmers to ecologically marginally growing areas 
or to city slums. Crop losses could mean loss of agricultural export revenues needed to 
finance imports. Weather-caused infrastructure damage harms the businesses dependent 
on the infrastructure, while repairing the damage and otherwise coping with disasters 
diverts resources from productive use. Financially hedging against climate change effect 
risks may, in various settings, help or harm insurance companies; in any case it costs 
resources. An unhealthy workforce, whether on the farm or in the city, will be less 
productive. 
With a globally interdependent economy, there is some risk that particular 
combinations of regional economic distress could lead to an international economic 
downturn. The chances of this happening might be increased if severe weather events 
(made more frequent by climate change) occurred at around the same time in different 
regions. Or, an abrupt, low-probability, high-consequence event such as the shutdown of 
the Atlantic “conveyor belt,” rapidly freezing much of northern Europe, might greatly 
damage one of the world’s major economic engines. 
Finally, the very unpredictability of climate change-related impacts on human 
activities could have a depressing effect on international investments. Uncertainty can 
foster investor caution and hesitation. 
GHG Emission Reduction Efforts 
The belief that GHG emissions are largely responsible for global warming, and 
that stabilization of atmospheric GHG could mitigate that warming and its effects, could 
lead to major socio-economic consequences. Although the U.S. Government currently 
takes the position, in contrast to that of many other nations, that GHG emission 
reductions are not called for, this position could change again.15 U.S. and other 
government laws and policies could impose a variety of regulations and incentives to 
reduce GHG emissions. 
If atmospheric GHG were stabilized, then it is plausible that the above-outlined 
effects of climate change, and thus their human consequences, would be reduced—
though there is still some debate over the degree or reduction possible. Those who 
question the value of reducing GHG emissions, however, argue that the costs would harm 
the economies of the nations attempting to do so. (Others argue that the costs can be less, 
and the benefits greater, than reduction opponents believe). 
Greater use of renewable energy resources and of distributed power production 
technologies might result in less vulnerability to extreme weather effects, since energy 
infrastructure damage might be more localized. 
                                                 
15 This is not an argument of the merits of the case about GHG emissions, nor a proposal that policy should change again, but 
merely a recognition of the possibility that the policy could change. 
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Sensitivity, Adaptability, and Vulnerability 
Analysts working with the IPCC have emphasized the importance of considering 
sensitivity, adaptability, and vulnerability in assessing potential climate change 
consequences. Sensitivity, for our purposes, is the degree to which the environmental 
systems upon which humans depend will respond to changed climatic conditions. 
Adaptability is the degree to which the human systems can change to cope with the 
environmental changes—whether in response to or in anticipation of the changes. 
Vulnerability is the extent of damage or harm the human systems may come to, given 
their levels of sensitivity and adaptability. 
Many societies, including the U.S. and other economically developed nations, 
probably have a resiliency in social and political institutions that will allow them to 
adapt. New technologies, especially if they can be transferred where and when they are 
needed, should facilitate adaptation. 
Wealthy individuals and groups in general will have more adaptive capacity than 
poor ones.16 As noted in the previous subsections, richer nations will have more adaptive 
capacity than poor ones.17 For example, a study of the potential impacts of climate 
change on the U.S. concluded: 
For the nation as a whole, direct economic impacts are likely to be modest, while in some 
places, economic losses or gains are likely to be large. For example, while crop yields are likely to 
increase at the national scale over the next few decades, large increases or decreases in yields of 
specific crops in particular places are likely. 18 
The vulnerability of many poorer countries may be exacerbated by trends that are 
proceeding independently of climate change effects. Rapid population growth, for 
example, is stressing land use, pressing migration to cities, presenting the challenge of 
large numbers of unemployed youth, and increasing pollution. Several regions of the 
world are already short of fresh water. Health services and public health infrastructures 
are already wanting. 
Although wealth may be the most important indicator of adaptive capacity, social-
psychological factors could hinder adaptation in either poor or rich countries. First, if 
change takes place gradually enough, societies may not recognize the need for adaptive 
change until very late in the game. Responses they do make may favor preservation of the 
                                                 
16 Thomas Homer –Dixon argues that powerful groups in a society may react to environmental scarcities with “resource capture”: 
 
Resource capture eoccurs when a fall in the quality and quantity of a renewable resource interacts with population growth  to 
encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor. This shift can produce dire environmental 
scarcity for poorer and weaker groups in the society. 
Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 73. 
17 On the other hand, it might be argued that nations with well-developed infrastructures (e.g. transportation, utilities) might also be 
subject to complexities and rigidities that make some adaptations difficult. The northern US/southern Canada power blackout and 
the problems in restoring Washington, DC area power after a hurricane—both in 2003—might be cited as examples. 
18 National Assessment Synthesis Team, Climate Change Impacts on the United States:The Potential Consequences of Climate 
Variability and Change (US Global Change Research Program,Washington DC,2000),  p. 9, at 
http://www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/overpdf/1IntroA.pdf  
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status quo. As an example, consider the tendencies of residents of flood-prone areas to 
build higher dikes or to demand more publicly-supported flood insurance rather than to 
relocate. Second, the complexity and unpredictability of climate change effects and 
consequences may make anticipatory adaptation very difficult—regions, states, and 
localities may be very uncertain about what effects may reach them and when. Third, 
(quite in contrast to the first point), changes may be very abrupt and, worse, not end in a 
stable state. For example, cooling might quickly follow heating, flooding might quickly 
follow drought. 
The study of impacts on the U.S. of climate change effects points out:  
Vulnerability in the US is linked to the fates of other nations, and we cannot evaluate 
national consequences due to climate variability and change without also considering 
the consequences of changes elsewhere in the world. The US is linked to other 
nations in many ways, and both our vulnerabilities and our potential responses will 
likely depend in part on impacts and responses in other nations. For example, 
conflicts or mass migrations resulting from resource limits, health, and environmental 
stresses in more vulnerable nations could possibly pose challenges for global security 
and US policy.19 
International Security Consequences 
The theme of the workshop reported here was the implications of climate change 
for international security. Therefore, our focus is on the potential connections between 
climate change consequences and the ability of nation-states (individually or in groups) to 
secure themselves from harm caused by other nation-states. There is an emerging school 
of thought that proposes that a better perspective is that of  “human security” rather than 
just the security of nations.20 This perspective seems especially relevant to the climate 
change issue, because the primary societal effects will be on people and communities. 
Nevertheless, our interest here is in how those effects may in turn affect the security of 
nations. This is a matter of focusing on one set of problems rather than another (even 
while recognizing that they may all be related); it is not a matter of arguing that the 
human security perspective is invalid.21 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example, the Program on Human Security at the Harvard Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences argues: 
In the last two decades, the international community has begun to conclude that attempts to ensure the territorial security of 
nation-states through military power have failed to improve the human condition. Despite astronomical levels of military 
spending, deaths due to military conflict have not declined. Moreover, even when the borders of some states are secure 
from foreign threats, the people within those states do not necessarily have political freedom and democracy, proper health 
care, education, enough food, or freedom from crime. In response to these developments, the international community has 
gradually moved to combine economic development with military security and other basic human rights to form a new 
concept of human security. Unfortunately, by common assent the concept lacks both a clear definition, consistent with the 
aims of the international community. 
Found at http://www.cbrss.harvard.edu/programs/hsecurity/hsmission.htm.  
21 Some, however, argue that talking about “environmental security” and taking a national (vs. human) security perspective on 
climate change “…risks making it a military rather than a foreign policy problem and a sovereignty rather than global commons 
problem.” John Barnett, “Security and climate change,” Global Environmental Change 13 (2003), p. 14. 
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There are several ways to hypothesize that societal impacts (relating to water, 
agriculture, infrastructure, health, finance, economics) of climate change effects could 
result in international security problems (or benefits): 
 aggravation of internal conflicts,  
 increased poverty and inequality, 
 aggravation of existing international conflicts, 
 diversion of national and international resources from international 
security programs (military or non-military), 
 contribution to global economic decline or collapse, 
 international realignments based on climate change mitigation policies, or 
 Reduction of oil dependence (benefit). 
The argument here is not that climate change consequences are going to be either 
necessary or sufficient causes for international security problems. It is possible, though, 
that they might tip already precarious situations. 
Internal Conflict 
Few if any would argue that the effects of climate change are likely to lead 
directly to rebellion, revolution, civil war, or the breakdown of states. On the other hand, 
it seems quite plausible that the societal consequences of climate change effects 
(described above) could exacerbate existing social and political tendencies to conflict. In 
addition, a state with limited capacity to respond to environmental stresses could find 
itself less able to respond to insurgent threats. Not only would its economic and military 
resources be spread more thinly, but its populations could come to see it as less able to 
perform the functions of government. 
Aggravation 
Climate change consequences could exacerbate political conflicts in various ways. 
As noted above, climate change-induced scarcities (e.g. arable land or fresh water) can 
lead to increased disparities in wealth and power. Where such disparities lead to 
movements for radical change, insurgency sometimes occurs. Migration to cities could 
concentrate large numbers of dissatisfied unemployed people. Severe national economic 
difficulties could increase support for radical change. Alternatively, scarcities in 
resources such as land or water may give already conflicting identity groups additional 
reasons to fight. Internal migration resulting from climate change affects could also 
stimulate identity group conflicts. 22  
                                                 
22Examples of identity group conflicts (but ones not centering on resource scarcity) are those between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda 
or Serbs and Muslims in the Balkans. 
 23
International Repercussions 
Internal conflicts can have international repercussions. First, states can fail or at 
least become highly dysfunctional—not leading to some new regime, but to breakdown 
of law and order and most other governmental functions. Armed factions, headed by local 
warlords, may be in more or less continuous conflict. Recent examples include Somalia 
and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal (and, some would say, again today). A 
nation with a failed state can threaten international security in various ways. It may 
become the locus of criminal activity, such as narcotics, people smuggling, or black 
market trade (such as the diamond trade in Sierra Leone). It may become a magnet and 
harbor for terrorist groups. 
Unresolved civil conflicts can also draw in external intervention. Competing 
foreign powers may see an opportunity to harass or gain ground on their adversaries—as 
happened frequently during the Cold War. Or, they may see a need to restore order so as 
to maintain access to strategic commodities or locations (such as oil in Saudi Arabia). 
Even in the absence of external competitors, failed states may seem to require the 
intervention of other national or international peacekeeping forces. This can place the 
peacekeeping forces at risk, or at least dilute the international community’s pool of 
available peacekeepers. 
Civil conflicts may be internally resolved, but in ways that end up threatening 
other nations. Economic distress in the 1920s and 1930s fostered the rise of aggressive 
militarist regimes in Germany, Japan, and Italy. Law and order of a sort was brought to 
post-Soviet Afghanistan by the Taliban, whose religious extremism led them to harbor 
like-minded international terrorists. 
Poverty and Inequality 
Poverty and inequality (which may be amplified by climate change consequences) 
do not necessarily lead to revolution or state failure. They may, however, increase the 
appeal of extremist groups who threaten domestic stability or who advocate international 
terrorism. The Madrasahs, or religious schools, of Pakistan, for example, provide 
education, food, shelter, and militant Islamic indoctrination to poor youth. 
International Conflicts 
Just as climate change consequences are unlikely by themselves to cause civil 
wars, they are unlikely directly to cause international wars. Yet some indirect pathways 
are imaginable. Mentioned above was the establishment of aggressive regimes. Climate 
change-related migration might aggravate existing conflicts: an external state might come 
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to the defense of its own ethnic kind across the border. Competition for climate-change 
redistributed resources—especially water—might aggravate existing conflicts.23  
National Resource Diversion 
Maintaining the U.S. role of sole global superpower is expensive—with the 
military budget alone approaching $450 billion. A trillion dollar deficit is projected for 
the next decade. Towards the end of that decade, the baby-boomer generation will start 
collecting Social Security and Medicare entitlements, and continue doing so for 30 years 
or more. Even though the U.S. may be rich enough to adapt successfully to possible 
climate change effects, the body politic may decide that it cannot both do that and 
continue to support the U.S. role of sole global superpower. Further, should worldwide 
climate change effects lead to international economic decline, the U.S. is unlikely to 
escape.  
The ability of other relatively wealthy nations to contribute militarily or 
economically to maintaining international peace could likewise be diminished by the 
demands of climate change adaptation. (Moreover, most of the other wealthier nations are 
facing a population aging problem even greater than that of the U.S.) This decline in 
contributions from the wealthy could happen as less developed countries undergo even 
greater stress and need more international assistance than they have before. The demand 
for international peace restoration and peacekeeping, disaster relief, and development aid 
could grow even as the supply diminishes. 
Global Economic Decline 
A climate-change induced global economic decline would mean the interruption 
of income streams, default of debts, curtailment of international investments, cascading 
national bankruptcies, and growing individual and national poverty. How the world might 
emerge from all this is unpredictable, but the experience of the Great Depression of the 
1930s does not offer a reassuring precedent. 
International Realignments 
In geopolitical terms, the end of the cold war left the U. S. as the world’s 
dominant economic and military power. It is possible to imagine the consequences of 
climate change either weakening or strengthening that position. The results in either 
direction, however, might not necessarily be greater international peace and stability. A 
weakened U.S. would be less capable of playing a stabilizing role—whether in 
international financial markets or in potential military conflicts. For example, how the 
regional tensions among China, Korea, and Japan might play out without the U.S. 
presence is not at all clear. One possibility would be decisions by Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan that they need their own nuclear weapons to deter Chinese domination. 
                                                 
23 There is little historical evidence of nations going to war directly over water, though sudden changes may outpace the ability of 
joint water management institutions to resolve water disputes. See Aaron T. Wolf, Shira B. Yoffe, and Mark Giordano, “International 
waters; identifying basins at risk,” Water Policy (2003), pp. 29-60, at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/00501/0029/005010029.pdf. 
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On the other hand, an even more lopsided distribution of power between the U.S. 
and the rest of the world might also carry risks. Not only non-state terrorist groups (as 
with Al Qaeda today), but some nations might see expansion of asymmetric warfare 
capabilities as the only way to protect themselves against U.S. domination. The result 
might be more attacks on U.S. interests at home and abroad. Traditional U.S. military 
capabilities may have limited effectiveness against such attacks. 
Should global warming continue, and should much of the world blame that on 
disproportionate U.S. emissions of GHG, and on failure of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto-
Bonn accord, then the U.S. may find that the international cooperation it seeks on various 
fronts (from trade agreements to counter-terrorist police work) will be harder to come by.  
Reduction of Oil Dependence 
Controversy continues over how much global warming will occur and how much 
reduction of GHG emissions it would take to mitigate that. However, should the current 
and future heavy energy users in the world successfully switch to non-fossil fuel sources, 
then the global dependence on imported oil would begin to decline. This development 
would severely affect the economies that depend on oil exports, but ease the national 
security threats that come with oil supply disruptions in the importing countries24 
Research, Technology, and Policy Discussion 
It can be argued, then, that (depending on the substitute energy sources) a world 
weaned from oil consumption could not only be less vulnerable to energy supply 
disruptions, but also to the higher levels of global warming that IPCC models forecast. 
But several countervailing considerations apply. First, even with reduced emissions, 
atmospheric GHG levels may not stabilize in time to prevent substantial further warming. 
Second, the models do not offer clear guidance about how much emission reduction will 
result in how much lower global temperatures. Third, it is an open question as to whether 
the world’s nations will in fact act to significantly reduce GHG emissions. Fourth, even 
lower levels of warming might trigger dramatic climate change: non-linear forces may be 
in play. Finally, the paleoclimatic record shows that abrupt climate changes have 
occurred on Earth without the presence of anthropogenic forcing. The kinds of change 
described above could occur whether GHG are playing a decisive role or not. 
It seems prudent, therefore, to plan ahead for potential climate change 
consequences. There are many uncertainties—about how much climate change is likely 
to happen, what effects will result, where and when they will occur, and how vulnerable 
the affected countries and regions will be to negative social, political, and economic 
consequences. Because of these uncertainties, it is difficult to assess just how much 
investment in this planning would be reasonable. But two general guidelines seem 
sensible:  
                                                 
24 See Karas, Energy and National Security, op. cit. footnote 2, pp. 10-15. 
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 First, it would be worthwhile to reduce the uncertainties about what is 
happening and what will happen.  
 Second, there may be “no regrets” measures that not only would enhance 
adaptation to climate change effects and their human consequences should 
these occur, but also would bring benefits to human, national, and 
international security whether or not negative climate change effects 
happen. 
The following suggestions do not constitute a well-developed set of proposals, but 
are ideas that emerged during the closing workshop discussions. 
Research 
Continued research on the phenomenon of climate change, its causes and effects, 
could help in at least two ways. First, greater certainty about the future pace of change 
and the human role in accelerating or decelerating it might encourage political decisions 
to take mitigating (GHG reduction) actions. (Alternatively, such research might prevent 
waste of resources on policies that could have little mitigating effect). Second, more 
detailed understanding of when and where climate change effects might strike could 
permit more anticipatory adaptive measures. 
Integrated with the climate change research, social science research might better 
pinpoint the countries and regions most vulnerable to negative climate change 
consequences (i.e. most sensitive and least able to adapt). This research would seek better 
understanding of: 
 how the various human consequences of climate change effects might 
interact with one another,  
 what capabilities for managing change states have or lack ,  
 what conditions are more likely to lead to internal conflict, and  
 how bilateral or international assistance for anticipatory adaptation could 
then be focused on the most vulnerable (or, from a more realpolitik point 
of view, those most likely to cause international security difficulties.) 
Short of precisely predicting climate change phenomena and their probable effects 
on human societies, it might at least be possible to get earlier warning of processes that 
are underway. Climate scientists and social scientists, perhaps aided by computing 
technologies, might generate a wide range of possible climate change-effect/human 
consequence pathways or scenarios. They might then identify constellations of events and 
data (physical and social) to be monitored continuously for indications that threatening 
scenarios were emerging.  
Another class of research would be the development of technologies that might 
facilitate adaptation to climate change effects. Agriculture in particular might benefit. 
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One example might be techniques for growing crops with less than the usual amounts of 
water. Another might be ways of adapting crops and farming methods to changes in 
temperature and growing seasons. 
Policy and Technology Deployment Measures 
One policy change to anticipate human consequences of climate change would be 
to tailor current bilateral and multilateral development assistance to improve the 
capacities of poorer countries to adapt to climate change effects. For example, energy 
infrastructures might be designed in a distributed way that was less vulnerable to large-
scale weather-related outages. Agricultural development could deploy the kinds of 
technologies alluded to above. Land-use planning could anticipate potential climate 
change effects, perhaps as predicted by improved atmospheric models. 
Developing countries public health surveillance and service infrastructures are 
already quite weak. Globally, international public health surveillance could also stand 
improvement. The already significant problem of emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases makes improvement of national and international public health capabilities a “no 
regrets” policy. 
An anticipatory policy measure for the wealthier states—the U.S. in particular—
might be the creation of a standing “reconstruction expeditionary force” that would be 
prepared to assist stricken nations in adaptive responses to extreme weather events and 
abrupt environmental changes. This service would be analogous to military intervention 
forces, but instead deploy expertise and technology in infrastructure restoration. Although 
its long-term purpose might be to respond to climate-change consequences, it might also 
function in post-conflict situations—as, for example in Iraq. Such a capability, then, 
could turn out to be another “no regrets” measure. 
Conclusion 
The lesson from the Sandia workshop is not that the climate change phenomenon 
is leading inexorably to disaster for the human race. Rather, it is that there is a wide range 
of potential climate-related hazards to human economic and social systems. The 
extremity of these hazards could be larger than what we have considered to be “normal.” 
Failure to adapt effectively o these events could imperil international peace and security. 
 Climate change happens. Sometimes it has happened very abruptly. Whether or 
not the current global warming trend can be fully attributed to human-generated 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere or not, continued study of the potential physical 
effects of climate change and their consequences for human society is in order. This 
study would benefit from continued communication among both physical and social 
scientists in an effort to better understand the risks and the most effective strategies for 
adaptation and recovery.  
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It is also worth considering whether precautionary preparations to cope with them 
would be prudent. However, since the timing and locations of these hazards are so 
uncertain, it seems prudent to search for “no regrets” measures that would bring benefits 
before –or whether or not—they are needed to respond to climate change consequences. 
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Appendix I: Visiting Participants 
Ricardo Bayon 
…is a fellow with the New America Foundation, where he is examining policy implications of the 
interaction between the financial system and the environment, how socially responsible investment can 
play a role in promoting environmental objectives, transparency in the financial system and its effect on the 
environment, and the ways in which unrecognized and undervalued environmental goods and services 
subsidize the economic system. He is developing strategies to harness the creativity of capital markets to 
help preserve the world ecosystem. He has advised numerous international organizations, including the 
Inter-American Development Bank, Domini Social Investments, The National Wildlife Federation, and 
Rainforest Action Network. He has recently been working with The Nature Conservancy to create a new 
institution that will bring together insurers, bankers, financiers and environmentalists to come up with new 
approaches to environmental protection. 
 
Kent Hughes Butts   
…is  Professor of Political Military Strategy, and the Director of the National Security Issues Branch in the 
Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College. His prior positions include: Research Professor in 
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the Army War College, Associate Professor, Science Research 
Laboratory, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and United States Defense and Army Attaché, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Malawi. Dr. Butts teaches the Army War College Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Environmental Security, and Strategic Planning elective courses and has conducted international 
conferences, workshops, or games for the Departments of Defense in Australia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Canada, and the United States. He headed the U.S. delegation and co-chaired the NATO Environmental 
Security Pilot Study Meetings in Warsaw and Prague in 1997, and was a member of the U.S. delegation to 
the OSCE Economic Forum (Prague) and NATO Environmental Security Meetings (Vancouver) in 1999. 
He is author or editor of numerous national security publications, and co-author of the book, Geopolitics of 
Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower. 
 
Jack Goldstone 
…is a sociologist and the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel Professor be joining the George Mason University 
School of Public Policy as the; he is also a Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center. His research interests 
include revolutions and social movements, demography and international security and social theory. 
Among his many publications is the book chapter “Imminent Political Conflicts Arising from China’s 
Population Crisis” (1999). Professor Goldstone has conducted over twenty years of prize-winning research 
on social conflict and social change, focusing on global patterns of comparative development. He has acted 
as a consultant to the World Bank, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency. At UC Davis he 
directed the Center for History, Society, and Culture as well as teaching Sociology (1989-present) and 
International Relations (1992-2003).  
 
Charles D. Kolstad 
… is Professor of Environmental Economics and Policy at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
where he is jointly appointed in the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management and the 
Department of Economics. At UCSB he leads the NSF-funded PhD program in Economics and 
Environmental Science.  He is particularly interested in the role of information in environmental decision-
making and regulation.  His past work in energy markets has focused on coal and electricity markets, 
including the effect of air pollution regulation on these markets. With over 100 publications, he has 
published in a variety of journals. He is an editor of Resource and Energy Economics, has been an 
Associate Editor of the Journal of Environmental Economics & Management (JEEM), and is currently on 
the editorial board of Land Economics and JEEM. In 2000, Oxford University Press published his 
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undergraduate text, Environmental Economics. He also co-edited the North-Holland book Measuring the 
Demand for Environmental Quality. His prior, non-academic, experience includes working at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and in the Peace Corps in West Africa. 
 
Ana Rosa Moreno 
… is on the staff of the U.S.-Mexico Foundation for science, where she works on issues relating to 
environmental health on the U.S.-Mexican border and on global climate change. She worked on the Second 
Assessment Report, IPCC and in the third Assessment Report, IPCC (WMO/UNEP) in the impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability group. She is co-author of different UN publications on climate change and 
health and author of international papers on the subject. She has attended several international meetings on 
climate change. She is a reviewer of UNDP publications on climate change. She is a reviewer for 
Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change research proposals. 
 
Gaurav Rajen  
… is a consultant to the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories where he has been 
studying regional environmental security and cooperation and nuclear nonproliferation issues in South 
Asia. He has worked as a consultant and a senior manager for several U.S. and international federal, state, 
tribal and private agencies and as a Research Associate Professor in Civil engineering at the University of 
New Mexico. Since 1996, he has managed a security, environmental and energy studies consulting firm 
with a primary focus on South Asia. He has been a member of the US Environmental Protection Agency 
and the US Department of Energy’s national working groups that developed guidance on select 
environmental management issues, testified to US Congressional subcommittees on Navajo uranium mine 
remediation, and organized environmental security workshops in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the US. He 
has published numerous reports and papers in disarmament, engineering, and social science journals. Some 
of his publications include, Cooperative Environmental Monitoring in the Coastal Regions of India and 
Pakistan, and Cooperative Remote Sensing Projects to Increase Nuclear Transparency in South Asia.  
 
Jack Schick 
…has worked with the U.S. Department of State on international political disputes over adaptation and 
greenhouse gas mitigation responsibilities in the context of the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the putative Kyoto Protocol--as a member of the US delegation--roughly since 1990, when he 
participated in the final plenary of the IPCC on its First Assessment Report. He works quite closely on the 
USG Interagency Working Group on Climate Change with DOE, EPA, NOAA, Agriculture, and USAID 
and with the US Embassy Science Counselors. 
 
Andrew T. Price-Smith 
…is Assistant Professor of Environmental Science and Policy, and Research Fellow at the Center for 
Globalization at the University of South Florida – St. Petersburg. He earned his doctorate from the 
University of Toronto in 1999, and his post-doctoral training at CIESIN and the School of International and 
Public Affairs of Columbia University. He is author of The Health of Nations :Infectious Disease, 
Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development  (MIT Press, 2002) and 
editor of Plagues and Politics: Infectious Disease and International Policy (Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 
2001). He currently acts as consultant to the United States Institute of Peace, to Special Operations of the 
USDOD, and to the World Development Group of the World Bank. His research interests include the 
relationship among infectious disease, environmental change, international prosperity, and political 
stability. 
 
 
Marvin S. Soroos 
…is professor of  political science and public administration at North Carolina State University (Raleigh, 
NC), where he has taught courses on global problems and policies since 1970.  His publications have made 
a significant contribution to extending the field of policy studies to the international and global levels of 
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political organization.  His best known book, Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy 
(University of South Carolina Press, 1986) received his college's Distinguished Research Publication 
Award in the Social Sciences in 1987. He has also been a pioneer in the field of global environmental 
politics, which his been his principal teaching and research interest since the mid-1970s.  With David Orr 
(currently of Oberlin College), he co-edited  an early book in the field entitled The Global Predicament:  
Ecological Perspectives on World Order (University of North Carolina Press, 1979). His most recent book, 
The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving a Global Commons (University of South Carolina Press, 1997) 
examines the evolution of international law pertaining to protection of the atmosphere, more specifically 
efforts to address the problems of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, acid rain, depletion of the ozone 
layer, and global climate change. He has been the International Studies Association’s liaison to the 
International Human Dimensions of Global Environment Change Program (IHDP) and served on the 
scientific advisory committee for the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Program, which 
is associated with IHDP. 
 
Jennifer Turner 
…is a senior project associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Project 
(ECSP) where she directs the project's activities on environmental issues in China. As coordinator of 
ECSP's China Environment Forum she holds monthly meetings in Washington, DC on a variety of energy 
and environmental challenges facing China. Besides meetings in Washington, DC, She has coordinated 
several study tour activities in China and the United States bringing together Chinese and U.S. experts on 
issues of environmental nongovernmental organizations, environmental journalism, water conflict 
resolution, and municipal financing of environmental infrastructure. In addition to coordinating the China 
Environment Forum, she also serves as editor of the Wilson Center's journal, the China Environment 
Series. She recently coauthored with Pam Baldinger the policy brief “Crouching Suspicions Hidden 
Potential: U.S. Environmental and Energy Cooperation with China.” 
 
David Unnewehr 
 ...is Senior Research Manager, Policy Development and Research Department, American Insurance 
Association (AIA) in Washington D.C.  His work focuses on research and policy impacting disaster risk 
assessment, mitigation, and policy, including the new terrorism risk, property-casualty insurance 
economics, auto and homeowners insurance, credit-based insurance scoring in underwriting, regulatory 
modernization, urban insurance availability, and climate change. Mr. Unnewehr authored the April 1999 
American Insurance Association policy paper on climate change, “Property-Casualty Insurance and the 
Climate Change Debate: A Risk Assessment.”  
 
Shira Yoffe 
…is a Science Officer and AAAS Diplomacy Fellow in the Office of Global Change, U.S. Department of 
State. Her current portfolio includes impacts and adaptation to climate change, water and climate, and Earth 
observations systems. She is author of numerous articles on transboundary water resources and her doctoral 
research explored indicators of conflict and cooperation in international river basins.  She has a Ph.D. in 
Geography from Oregon State University and a Masters in international relations from the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. She has also worked as a research scientist in the Emerging 
Technologies group, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and as project manager of the Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database at Oregon State University.  
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Appendix II: Sandia Participants 
Mark Allen 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/ Nuclear & Risk Technologies/ Risk & Reliability 
Analysis  
Mark Allen is the manager of the Risk & Reliability Department in the Nuclear Energy Programs Center.  
The Department serves customers both at the NRC and DOE.  Mark holds graduate degrees in economics, 
business and computer science. 
Arnold Baker  
Arnold B. Baker is the Chief Economist of Sandia National Laboratories.  His current responsibilities 
include serving as the primary strategic planning resource for the Energy & Infrastructure Assurance 
Business Unit, managing the Unit's economic and public policy analysis and modeling, and serving as 
economic and strategic planning advisor to Sandia Corporation.  In addition, he is the Past President of the 
United States Association for Energy Economics.  He holds a BA in History and MA and Ph.D. degrees in 
economics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
Dianne Barton 
Information, Computation and Engineering Sciences/ Computation, Computers, Information & 
Mathematics/ Evolutionary Computing 
Dianne Barton holds a PhD in Geochemistry and is currently working on development of multi-agent 
models of complex systems on massively parallel platforms.  She is interested in coupling an agent based 
model to a global climate model to simulate how international resource consumption will respond to 
climate change, how trade networks and international alliances are likely to adapt, and how alterations in 
energy consumption and land use will feedback on climate. 
David Betsill 
National Security & Arms Control/ International Security Problems/ International Security Initiatives 
The Center works with US and international participants to explore ways that technology can facilitate 
regional confidence building in such areas as arms control, nonproliferation, and environmental security. 
David is a hydrologist and environmental engineer with a broad interdisciplinary background and 
experience in environmental characterization, monitoring, and remediation. Recent regional and 
transboundary projects include cooperative applications of technology and confidence building measures 
for sustainable grazing and agriculture in the Middle East, and for water quality monitoring across 
transboundary rivers in Central Asia and South Asia. 
Dave Borns  
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/ Geoscience & Environment Center/ Underground 
Storage 
Mark Boslough 
Information, Computation and Engineering Sciences/ Computation, Computers & Math/ Evolutionary 
Computing 
Member of the technical staff in the Evolutionary Computing and Agent-Based Modeling Department.  His 
background is physics and geophysics, with an emphasis on computational modeling.  He was PI on a 
project to develop an MPI parallel version of the paleoclimate code Genesis, and was the national 
laboratory member of the Partnership for Modeling Earth System History (PMESH), an NSF program. "He 
is currently collaborating with the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) on their Spectral 
Element Atmospheric Model (SEAM), a dynamical core for climate General Circulation Models (GCM)." 
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Chris Cameron 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/ Energy & Transportation Security/ Energy Systems 
Analysis 
Chris joined Sandia in 1977 after earning a PhD in Physics from Duke U. He initially worked in nuclear 
safeguards for the civilian nuclear power cycle, but has worked in the field of solar energy and energy 
systems analysis since 1981. 
Stephen Conrad 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/ Information & Infrastructure Systems/  Critical 
Infrastructure Surety 
Stephen Conrad works as an analyst for the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) 
where he is developing high-level modeling tools for evaluating infrastructure interdependencies and system 
vulnerabilities. Steve has performed infrastructure interdependency assessments for California and assessments 
of the effects of proposed security policies on operations in selected Pacific Northwest ports. He is also working 
with Lucent Technologies to build detailed models of telecommunication system performance under various 
disruption scenarios. Prior to joining the NISAC team, Steve worked on various problems in the areas of 
hydrology, probabilistic performance assessments for radioactive waste disposal, and systems analysis.  
Warren Cox 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/Energy & Transportation Security Center/ 
Environment Monitoring & Characterization Department 
His professional training is business, Hydrology,  Public Health, and applied mathematics.  He spent 9 
years running Sandia's Environmental Restoration Project, followed by 3 years in program development, 
mainly advanced sensor technologies.  In partnership with another Sandian, he now oversees the 
International Sustainable Engineering Group (6233), primarily doing technology deployment of renewable 
energy in the developing world, mostly Latin America.  He is interested sustainable development to address 
the roots of terrorism, improve the human condition through technology, and improve global security.   
Jeff Danneels  
National Security & Arms Control/ Security Systems & Technology/ Civilians Surety Programs 
Department Manager within the Security Systems and Technology Center at Sandia National Laboratories.  
He manages critical infrastructure security programs and is responsible for the Risk Assessment 
Methodology for Water Utilities, RAM-W.  Shortly after the events of 9/11, he testified to Congress on two 
occasions.  His first testimony concerned the security of the water infrastructure and in the second he 
outlined security research needs to better protect the water infrastructure.   
Peter Davies  
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/Geoscience & Environment Center 
Director of Geoscience & Environment Center; SNL Water Initiative Coordinator; member of Governor’s 
Blue Ribbon Task Force on Water.  Fields of Discipline:  Geology and Applied Earth Sciences 
Bob Eagan  
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division  
Vice President of Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division with responsibilities for fossil, 
renewable and nuclear energy, geosciences, and nuclear power safety and repositories, information 
technology programs and programs responsible for the safety and security of commercial aviation and 
infrastructure protection.  Previously he was Vice President of Science Technology and Components where 
he was responsible for R&D in materials, microelectronics, and manufacturing technology.  He holds Ph.D. 
and MS degrees in Ceramic Engineering from the University of Illinois and a BS in Ceramic Engineering 
from Alfred University. 
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Scott Jones  
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/Energy and Transportation Security Center/Energy 
Systems Analysis  
Mechanical Engineer working in the Energy Systems Analysis Department (6202).  He is interested in 
broad-scope energy modeling and scenario analysis 
Jay Keller  
California Laboratory/Combustion and Physical Sciences Center/Engine Combustion & Hydrogen  
Jennifer Nelson  
Information, Computation and Engineering Sciences/Computation,  
Computers and Math Center/New Initiatives 
Manager of the Evolutionary Computing and Agent-Based Modeling Department. This Department is 
pursuing the development of the next generation of climate modeling and incorporating agent -based 
modeling to enhance our understanding of the economic and social impacts of climate change.  
Rush Robinett  
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/Energy and Transportation Security Center Energy 
& Transportation Security 
Jerry Simmons  
Science & Technology and Partnerships Division/Physical and Chemical Sciences Center/Semiconductor 
Materials & Device Sciences Department 
Manager of the Semiconductor Material and Device Sciences Dept.  Jerry is head of Sandia's Solid State 
Lighting program, which involves about 40 researchers, and is heavily involved in a national industrial 
consortium on solid state lighting for energy efficiency improvements. 
Hank Westrich  
Science & Technology and Partnerships Division/Laboratory Directed Research & Development 
Gerry Yonas  
Chief Scientist and Director, Advanced Concepts Group 
Physicist with a background in technology aspects of strategic national security issues current focused on 
the war on terrorism. 
Bernie Zak 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/Energy and Transportation Security Center 
Environment Monitoring & Characterization Department 
Develop and manage the DOE Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Climate Research site on the 
North Slope of Alaska; interests: climate-related atmospheric and radiative transfer phenomena; use of 
satellite remote sensing at high latitudes. 
 
 
Rapporteurs: 
Connie Brooks 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division/ Energy & Transportation Security/ Solar Programs 
Judy Moore 
Advanced Concepts Group 
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Ron Pate 
Advanced Concepts Group 
Intersection and interdependency of technical, socio-economic, and national/global secuity issues tied to 
energy, water, agriculture, development, and environment.   Formal training in applied physics, electrical 
and systems engineering, with specific expertise in energy systems, sensor systems, electromagnetics, 
pulsed power and directed energy, and selected aspects of systems modeling and simulation. 
 
 
Facilitators: 
Warren Klein 
Energy, Information & Infrastructure Surety Division, Energy & Transportation Security/Business 
Management Systems Group 
Senior Administrator in the Nuclear Weapons Strategic Management Unit, works with senior executives in 
the areas of strategic and operational planning. Also designs and facilitates workshops and large meetings. 
Ron Stoltz 
Manger of the Sandia, California government relations office. 
His interest in climate change stems from a 1998 Sandia strategic planning exercise. Climate change was 
one of the potential “national and international challenges” that could rival nuclear proliferation as an area 
of concern and one that acould be addressed by a combination of technical, political, and sociological 
research. 
Jessica Turnley 
Advanced Concepts Group 
A cultural anthropologist, with interests in issues at the intersection of the social and technical, including 
the "cross-cultural" conversations that occur between scientists, citizens, and policy makers and the 
inclusion of the human in engineering design.  She has worked in areas including national security, 
economic evelopment, environmental risk analysis and management, and the development of science and 
engineering applications 
 
Organizer 
Tom Karas  
Advanced Concepts Group  
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Distribution: 
Ricardo Bayon 
New America Foundation 
8 Morning Sun Avenue 
Mill Valley, CA 94941 
 
Kent Butts 
Center for Strategic Leadership 
Army War College 
650 Wright Avenue 
Carlisle, PA  17013 
 
Jack Goldstone 
School of Public Policy 
George Mason University 
4400 University Drive 
Fairfax, VA  22030 
 
Charles Kolstad 
Donald Bren School of Environmental Science 
University of California  
Santa Barbara, CA  93106 
 
Ana Rosa Moreno 
The United States-Mexico Foundation for Science 
San Francisco N, 1626 Desp. 205 
Mexico, D.F. Mexico 
MEXICO 
 
Andrew Price-Smith 
University of South Florida 
502 S. Freemont #332 
Tampa, FL 33606 
 
Jack Schick 
U. S. Department of State 
2201 C Street NW, Room 4330 
Washington, DC 20520 
 
Marvin Soroos 
North Carolina State University 
Caldwell 212, Political Science 
Raleigh, NC 27695-8102 
 
Jennifer Turner 
Woodrow Wilson Center 
1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
 
David Unnewehr 
American Insurance Association 
1130 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 1000 
Washington, DC 20036 
 
Shira Yoffee 
U. S. Department of State 
2201 C Street NW, Room 4330 
Washington, DC  20520 
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